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Game Theory and Cognitive Warfare: Strategy in the Age of Perception

Introduction

Classical game theory, often described as the science of strategy, provides a framework for analyzing how decision-makers interact under rules and incentives. Born in the mid-20th century from the work of John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, and later John Nash, game theory distills complex strategic situations into models of players, choices, and payoffs. It assumes rational actors seeking to maximize their advantage, and it predicts outcomes based on those assumptions. These models have illuminated behavior in economics, politics, and military conflicts for decades, offering insight into everything from business competition to nuclear deterrence.

In parallel, the landscape of conflict has evolved. The emergence of cognitive warfare – the cyber-enabled manipulation of human perception and decision-making – represents a frontier where the battlefield is not physical territory or computer networks alone, but the minds of populations and leaders. Cognitive warfare (often equated with sophisticated social engineering) involves shaping or distorting an adversary’s perceptions, beliefs, and decisions through information tactics. In this paradigm, influence and deception become weapons as potent as missiles or malware. Understanding this new battlespace may benefit from the principles of game theory, yet it also challenges those principles by operating in a realm where the “rules of the game” are fluid and perceptions trump objective reality. This exposé explores the relationship between classical game theory and cognitive warfare: starting with the foundations of game theory and its traditional applications, and then examining how these ideas translate into a domain of conflict defined by information, psychology, and cyber operations. We will incorporate advanced frameworks – from the extension of the OSI model into cognitive layers to the use of OODA loops and Zero Trust concepts – to illustrate how strategists are reconceptualizing security and offense when human cognition is the prize. The goal is a narrative, comprehensive look at how rational strategy and psychological manipulation intersect, and what that means for modern conflict and security.

Classical Game Theory: Origins and Fundamental Principles

Game theory arose as a formal study of strategic decision-making in the 1940s, providing a language to analyze situations where multiple actors (or “players”) make interdependent decisions. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s landmark Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) laid the groundwork, and the field was famously extended by John Nash and others in subsequent decades. At its core, classical game theory models any scenario in which each player’s outcome depends on the choices of all. It is commonly applied to games ranging from simple two-player contests to complex multi-actor negotiations. Several key concepts underlie classical game theory:

Rational Choice: Players are assumed to be rational, meaning they will strive to maximize their own utility or payoff given the information and options available. Each player is assumed to have clear preferences and will choose the action that best serves those preferences (i.e. yields the highest expected payoff). This rational actor assumption underpins most game-theoretic predictions, although in reality it can be complicated by human emotion and bounded rationality (a point we will return to in the context of cognitive warfare).
Payoff Matrices and Utility: Outcomes of games are typically represented in payoff matrices or payoff functions. A payoff is the value (utility, profit, payoff points, etc.) a player receives for a given outcome. A simple example is a 2×2 matrix for two players, each with two strategies; each cell of the matrix lists the payoff to each player if those strategy choices coincide. Game theory abstracts these outcomes as numerical utilities to allow comparison – higher payoff means a more preferred outcome. The utility curve for a player describes how they value different outcomes or resources. Classical theory usually treats these preferences as given and fixed.
Zero-Sum vs. Non-Zero-Sum Games: Games are categorized by whether one player’s gain is exactly the other’s loss. In a zero-sum game, the total payoff to all players is constant; any advantage gained by one side comes at equal expense to the other. Many competitive scenarios like classic warfare or sports are modeled as zero-sum: one winner, one loser. In contrast, non-zero-sum games allow the possibility of mutual benefit or mutual harm – outcomes where all players can gain or all can lose. Cooperative economics or trade negotiations are often non-zero-sum, since it’s possible to find outcomes good (or bad) for everyone. Game theory formally recognizes both types. This distinction is crucial: strategy in a zero-sum context (pure adversarial conflict) often differs from strategy in an environment where cooperation can pay off or where competition can leave everyone worse off.
Equilibrium (Nash Equilibrium): Perhaps the most celebrated concept of game theory is the Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash. A Nash equilibrium is a stable state of the game where no player can unilaterally improve their payoff by changing their strategy, given the strategies of the others. In other words, each player’s choice is the best response to the other players’ choices. At equilibrium, no one has an incentive to deviate; it is an outcome of mutual best responses. Some games have a single Nash equilibrium; others have multiple or sometimes only mixed (probabilistic) equilibria. The Nash equilibrium concept formalized the idea of strategic stalemate or balance – for example, in the Cold War standoff, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction between nuclear superpowers can be seen as a Nash equilibrium (neither side can change its strategy of deterrence without making itself worse off). However, equilibria are not necessarily optimal for all players (classic example: the Prisoner’s Dilemma equilibrium is mutual defection, which is worse for both than mutual cooperation). Nash’s insight provides a baseline for predicting outcomes when each actor considers the likely responses of others.
Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Games: Game theory also distinguishes scenarios where binding agreements are possible (cooperative games) versus those where each player acts independently (non-cooperative games). In cooperative games, players might form coalitions and share payoffs according to some scheme, whereas non-cooperative game theory (the more common branch) focuses on predicting individual strategy choices without enforceable agreements. This is relevant to politics and warfare – alliances and treaties introduce cooperative elements, but in their absence we analyze each nation or actor on their own strategic incentives.
Repeated and Sequential Games: Many real conflicts and economic interactions are not one-off; they involve repeated encounters or sequences of moves. Classical game theory covers these with concepts like repeated games (where reputation and strategy evolution matter) and extensive-form games (game trees) for sequential decisions. Strategies can therefore be dynamic and contingent on past behavior, allowing for phenomena like deterrence, reciprocity, and signaling to emerge in the model.

These foundational principles of game theory have proven powerful in analyzing traditional domains. The assumption of rational, utility-maximizing players yields clear, sometimes counter-intuitive insights into how conflicts and negotiations can play out. For instance, game theory can explain why two firms might engage in a price war (each trying to undercut the other, even though both would profit by keeping prices high) or why mutually destructive arms races occur – because deviating from a costly equilibrium could leave one side at a relative disadvantage. Crucially, however, these predictions rely on a well-defined “game” – a set of rules, known payoffs, and common knowledge among players about those rules. This is where we begin to see the challenge in extending classical game theory to the world of cognitive warfare, where the very structure of the game can be obscured or manipulated by the participants.

Game Theory in Economics, Politics, and War: Traditional Applications

Before turning to cognitive warfare, it is useful to appreciate how game theory has historically been applied to economics, politics, and military strategy – the arenas that cognitive warfare now seeks to infiltrate. In each of these fields, game-theoretic reasoning has helped frame strategic problems:

Economics: Game theory revolutionized economics by moving beyond simple supply-demand equilibria to situations of strategic interaction, such as oligopoly competition and bargaining. Firms in a market are like players in a game, where each firm’s pricing, production, or innovation decisions affect the others’ profits. For example, consider two companies deciding whether to engage in a price war. If both cut prices, profits fall; if both keep prices high, they maintain profits; if one cuts and the other doesn’t, the one cutting gains market share. This scenario resembles the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma structure. Game theory predicts that without coordination, a likely equilibrium is both firms cutting prices (a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) even though both would be better off keeping prices high. Such insights explain real-world phenomena like price-fixing cartels (an attempt to escape the unfavorable equilibrium) and the fragility of such cooperation since each member has an incentive to cheat. Beyond markets, game theory informs auction design, contracting, and principal-agent problems in economics. The key point is that economic agents often behave strategically, anticipating reactions of competitors, consumers, or regulators – exactly the kind of reasoning game theory was built to analyze.
Politics and International Relations: Political contests and diplomacy are rife with strategic games. Election campaigns, for instance, involve candidates choosing positions and tactics while anticipating voters’ and opponents’ responses. International diplomacy can be modeled as a series of bargaining games or deterrence games. A famous application is nuclear strategy during the Cold War, extensively studied by game theorists like Thomas Schelling. The U.S. and Soviet Union were essentially players in a high-stakes game of chicken or prisoner’s dilemma: each faced pressure to arm for superiority, but an all-out arms race was costly and dangerous for both. Game theory clarified concepts like deterrence (using threats to influence an opponent’s choices), credible commitment (convincing the opponent you will actually carry out a threat or refrain from an action), and signaling (actions that communicate resolve or intentions). Schelling’s work showed how introducing risk in a controlled way – signaling a willingness to “dance on the edge of the cliff” in his metaphor – could coerce an opponent to back down. These strategies were predicated on the assumption that opponents were rational and valued self-preservation; thus, they would avoid choices leading to mutual destruction. In politics, zero-sum assumptions often prevail (one side’s win is the other’s loss in elections or war), but game theory also considers that some political interactions are non-zero-sum. For example, stable international cooperation can benefit all (as in treaties or trade pacts), whereas mutual hostility can harm all (as in the case of two rival parties whose constant cognitive attacks leave both discredited and the public worse off). Indeed, as one source notes, while politics is ostensibly zero-sum, in practice protracted conflict can produce “lower and lower approval ratings for both sides,” a lose-lose outcome exacerbated by external interference. Game theory provides a vocabulary for these scenarios (e.g. negative-sum games where both sides incur costs from conflict escalation).
Military Strategy: Military planning has long used game-like simulations to anticipate enemy behavior. Classic war-gaming, whether on a map table or via computer models, is essentially applied game theory. Each commander considers the possible moves and counter-moves of adversaries. Concepts such as the minimax strategy in zero-sum games (minimizing an opponent’s maximum possible gain, which in war translates to denying the enemy any decisive victory) guided planning. During the Cold War, as mentioned, nuclear standoffs and crisis negotiations (Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance) were analyzed with game theory to find equilibrium strategies like mutually assured destruction (where neither side strikes first because the retaliation would be catastrophic for all). Beyond nuclear issues, game theory has been applied to counter-insurgency (e.g. modeling local populations’ choices to support insurgents or government as a game of incentives), to alliance dynamics, and to emerging domains like cyber warfare in its early forms. A notable attribute of military applications is the importance of information – many military games are games of incomplete information where one side does not know the other’s capabilities or intentions for sure. This leads to use of Bayesian game models and the concept of signaling and screening. For example, a state may bluff strength to deter enemies (signal high capability), or conversely an enemy’s electronic silence might “screen” their true position. Classical game theory can handle such uncertainty by incorporating beliefs and updates (Bayesian Nash equilibrium), but it assumes players update their beliefs rationally according to Bayes’ rule when new information arrives. In real conflicts, misinformation and psychological factors can skew those beliefs – an insight that directly leads us into cognitive warfare.

Through these examples, we see that game theory’s power lies in simplifying reality to a strategic essence: players, strategies, and payoffs. It yields elegant solutions like equilibrium strategies and exposes the logic of deterrence and competition. However, the assumption that the game model is commonly known to all players – including the rules and payoffs – is a fragile one. Traditional uses of game theory often treat the "game" as given by external circumstances (for instance, the geopolitical situation, or market rules set by law). But what happens when one player can change the game itself? This question is at the heart of cognitive warfare.

The Emergence of Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive warfare refers to an emerging form of conflict where the primary battleground is the human mind. It involves the deliberate targeting of how people perceive reality and make decisions, using means that range from digital disinformation and propaganda to psychological operations. In essence, cognitive warfare is “cyber-enabled manipulation of human perception” – a convergence of cyber warfare and psychological warfare that aims to bend the adversary’s information environment to your will. While the term is relatively new, its roots lie in age-old practices (deception, subversion, propaganda) now supercharged by modern technology and connectivity. Social media manipulation, deepfake videos, fake news campaigns, and tailored propaganda are all tools of cognitive warfare. NATO has begun recognizing the “cognitive domain” as a critical dimension of conflict alongside land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. In fact, cognition is sometimes described as the sixth domain of warfare – with NATO officials referring to it as a new “operating dimension” where battles are fought through information and narrative. The maxim often cited is: “In cognitive warfare, the human mind becomes the battlefield.”

To illustrate, consider a few scenarios emblematic of cognitive warfare: A state-sponsored influence campaign floods social networks in a rival country with carefully crafted disinformation, sowing confusion and distrust among the population. An adversary leaks forged documents to derail diplomatic negotiations or to tarnish a leader’s reputation, hoping to alter the opponent’s political decision-making. Hackers don’t just steal data, but subtly manipulate it – for example, changing figures in a public database to influence economic decisions or public opinion. Or, in a military context, instead of jamming radar (traditional electronic warfare), an operator might inject misleading symbols into the radar screens (an information attack), causing commanders to make wrong moves. In each case, no physical harm is done and no computer networks are destroyed; instead, the “payload” is information that alters what the target believes to be true, leading them to voluntary but disadvantageous decisions.

Cognitive warfare is sometimes described as an extension of social engineering – the practice of manipulating people into divulging information or performing actions (like phishing attacks in cybersecurity). One definition puts it succinctly: “Cognitive Warfare, for our purposes, is simply next-order cyberwarfare, or ‘beyond the bits and bytes’. Social engineering would be another synonym”. The same source draws a direct parallel to game theory: “Classical Game Theory is ultimately about making decisions – given rules and utility curves (and their associated payoff functions) who does what? Social Engineering, on the other hand, could be described as an applied branch of Game Theory where the rules and utility curves are altered … to adjust an opponent’s play in reality.”. In other words, cognitive warfare is fundamentally about hacking the game – redefining the opponent’s perceived reality (the rules, the payoffs, the options they think they have) so that they willingly make decisions favorable to you. It goes “beyond the bits and bytes” of traditional cyber attacks and into the realm of ideas, narratives, and perceptions.

Several characteristics distinguish cognitive warfare from traditional forms of conflict:

Targets are Minds and Morale: Instead of targeting physical infrastructure or even IT systems, cognitive attacks target people’s understanding. This might be the morale of a population, the unity of an alliance, or the judgment of a key decision-maker. For example, a cognitive campaign might aim to erode public trust in elections, causing internal instability without ever touching a voting machine. The damage is intangible but potentially more enduring: broken societal consensus, fear, confusion, or radicalization.
Cyber as a Vector: Modern cognitive warfare is “cyber-enabled” in the sense that the internet, social media, and networked technologies are the delivery mechanisms. False information can be propagated instantaneously and amplified by algorithms. Cyber operations and cognitive operations often blend: a hack might steal data and release it with misleading context for propaganda; a botnet might not disable communications but instead flood them with specific messages. The ubiquity of connectivity means the cognitive domain is accessible battleground to state and non-state actors alike.
Asymmetry and Ambiguity: Cognitive attacks are relatively cheap and can be conducted stealthily or with plausible deniability. A lone actor or small group can have outsized impact with a clever influence operation. The ambiguity of attribution (who is behind a misinformation campaign?) and the blurry line between foreign interference and domestic free speech complicate responses. This asymmetry is attractive to actors who cannot challenge major powers with tanks or missiles but can do so with memes and fake accounts.
Blowback and Complexity: Manipulating an adversary’s perceptions can have unpredictable consequences, including backfiring on the initiator. Information is hard to contain; propaganda used abroad can spill into domestic discourse. One white paper on cognitive warfare cautions that such tactics “cannot be done in a silo – employing this tactic will have blowback on the aggressor’s population which must be accounted for.”. In a globally connected information space, attempts to deceive or divide an enemy might also erode trust among one’s own citizens if they encounter the same false narratives. This interdependence makes cognitive warfare a complex game with more than two players, often involving public opinion, media, and third-party observers.

In summary, cognitive warfare represents a shift from directly confronting an enemy’s forces or infrastructure to shaping the enemy’s decisions so they defeat themselves. It exploits the social and psychological layers of conflict. Given this, it is natural to ask: how do the principles of strategy from classical game theory apply in this new domain? Can the “games” of influence and perception be mapped and analyzed like the games of traditional conflict? The answer is a qualified yes – game theory remains a powerful tool for strategic thinking, but it must be stretched and adapted. The next sections explore this intersection in detail.

Game Theory Meets Cognitive Warfare: Decisions in the Domain of Perception

On the surface, cognitive warfare might appear to defy the neat models of classical game theory. After all, if one side is manipulating the other’s perceptions, are the players even playing the same game? Yet, on a deeper level, cognitive warfare is strategic interaction – it involves adversaries trying to outwit each other, anticipate responses, and maximize their objectives under uncertainty. This is fertile ground for game-theoretic reasoning, so long as we recognize how the “game” in cognitive warfare departs from classical assumptions.

1. The Metagame: Altering Rules and Utilities. In classical game theory, the rules of the game (what moves are available, what payoffs result) are usually fixed and known to all players. In cognitive warfare, a cornerstone tactic is to alter the perceived rules of the game for the opponent. In other words, one player behaves as though they are playing a higher-level metagame – not just choosing moves within a given game, but choosing ways to change the game that the other player is experiencing. The earlier quote encapsulated this: social engineering is game theory with altered rules and utility curves. What does this mean practically? It means that a cognitive warrior might, for example:

Altered Rules: Convince the opponent that a certain action is off-limits or pointless when in fact it is not. For instance, spreading a rumor that a ceasefire agreement is in effect could stop an opponent from launching an attack, effectively introducing a false “rule” in their decision matrix (“if ceasefire, then do not attack”). In a political context, an adversary might manipulate procedural rules indirectly – for example, flooding media with a narrative that delegitimizes a legal process, hoping the opponent will feel constrained or despairing about using that process. In game terms, the opponent’s strategy set is pruned or changed based on misinformation.
Altered Utility Curves: Change the opponent’s utility assessment of outcomes. If one can make the enemy perceive a high cost or low benefit for an action, the enemy may avoid that action – essentially a form of deterrence via deception. Conversely, offering (or seeming to offer) a high reward can lure an opponent into a trap. For example, a cognitive attack might exaggerate the consequences of one course of action (“If you intervene in Country X, it will become another endless quagmire”) so that policymakers assign a much higher negative payoff to that action and choose a different course. In social engineering on an individual level, think of a phishing email that threatens account closure (inventing a cost where none exists) unless the target clicks a link – the victim’s perceived payoff of clicking (avoiding loss) is manipulated. By altering perceptions of reward and risk (utility), the attacker guides the victim toward the desired decision.

In game theory terms, the cognitive attacker is trying to move the equilibrium of the game to a more favorable one by changing the opponent’s payoff function or information. Normally, equilibria are computed assuming certain payoffs; change those payoffs (even just the opponent’s subjective perception of them) and you change what strategy might be rational for them. Cognitive warfare thus often works by inducing the opponent to make what to them seems a rational choice, but only because they are operating on false or skewed data supplied by the attacker.

2. Incomplete Information and Deception Games. Cognitive warfare can be seen as a grand exercise in games of incomplete and imperfect information. In classical models like Bayesian games, players may be uncertain about some aspect of the game (e.g., the type or payoff of the opponent) and have beliefs that update upon receiving signals. Cognitive attacks are essentially strategic signals, often false or misleading, intended to induce wrong beliefs in the opponent. Game theory has long studied signaling in contexts like job market signaling or diplomatic ultimatums. In those models, an informed player sends a message and the other player updates their belief and reacts. Cognitive warfare takes this to an extreme: the attacker floods the environment with signals – propaganda messages, deepfakes, fabricated evidence – to make the target believe a certain state of the world or opponent’s intention is true or false. The defender, in turn, may engage in screening or verification strategies, trying to discern truth from deception. This interplay can be analyzed as a signaling game: the attacker chooses a “message” (e.g., a piece of disinformation), knowing the reality, and the defender must decide how to act on the message while uncertain if it’s true. An equilibrium of such a game might be one where the attacker’s best strategy is to lie in a specific way and the defender’s best response is to trust or disbelieve in a specific way. Unfortunately, in practice, human cognitive biases make us far from perfect Bayesian updaters – a point where classical game theory meets psychology. People do not always rationally incorporate new information; they might ignore evidence that contradicts their prior beliefs (confirmation bias) or be swayed by emotions and framing. Thus, cognitive warfare often exploits these deviations from rationality, creating systematic misperceptions. A strictly rational-actor model might underestimate how effective such tactics can be. Nevertheless, game theory offers a structured way to think about the sequence: send false signal -> update belief -> choose action. By identifying equilibria (for example, what mix of truth and lies from the attacker yields the best results given the defender’s strategy), strategists can attempt to anticipate and counter opponent behavior.

3. Multi-Stage OODA Loops: Getting Inside the Decision Cycle. Military strategist John Boyd’s OODA loop (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act) is a model of how humans and organizations process information and make decisions. In conflicts, Boyd argued, the side that can cycle through the OODA loop faster (observing the situation, orienting by analyzing it, deciding on a course, and acting) will have the advantage, as they can act before the opponent’s decisions are solidified. Cognitive warfare can be understood as an attempt to disrupt or hijack the opponent’s OODA loop. By injecting false observations or confusing orientations, an attacker can slow down the opponent’s cycle or cause a misstep in the decide/act phase. Notably, advanced cyber-cognitive frameworks explicitly include an OODA perspective: for example, an extension of the classic network model (OSI model) proposed by one group defines a top-layer “Cognition” layer that can Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, reflecting the idea that any effective cyber or cognitive platform must incorporate decision-making processes. If we treat the OODA loop as part of the “game” a decision-maker is playing against an adversary, then cognitive warfare aims to win the OODA game. Tactics might include: saturating the opponent’s observation channels with noise (disinformation overload), manipulating context during orientation (framing events misleadingly), or even anticipating and preempting decisions. The game-theoretic view here is that each side is effectively in a race condition – a repeated game where each iteration is “who completes their OODA loop correctly first.” Speed and accuracy are payoffs. By disrupting the opponent’s information intake or analysis (for instance, using deepfakes to make them misorient on who is friend or foe), you force them into either inaction or wrong action, yielding a strategic advantage. Thus, the OODA loop concept bridges classical strategy and cognitive strategy: it underscores that cognitive warfare is not just about one-off deception, but about continually out-deciding the opponent. Modern strategists maintain that the OODA loop remains fundamental and “will stand the test of time” even in cognitive dimensions – essentially, it’s a natural control cycle that any cognitive combatant must reckon with.

4. Mutable “Rules of the Game” and Hypergame Analysis. A striking implication of cognitive warfare is that different participants might not even agree on what game is being played. Each side has its own perception of the conflict. This recalls the concept of hypergames in strategy, where each player’s perception of the game (the options and payoffs) may differ. In a cognitive conflict, one side may be playing a covert game of subversion while the other believes it is peacetime or a routine political competition. The “rules” (such as norms of truth in media, or the boundary between legitimate persuasion and illegitimate propaganda) may be deliberately blurred by the attacker. For example, during an election, a democratic society might assume the “game” is a fair competition of policies, while an adversary is secretly injecting fake news to make it actually a game of manipulation. The defenders might not even realize a cognitive war game is on until damage is done. This asymmetry of awareness is itself a strategic advantage – akin to a poker game where one player sees some of the other’s cards or has loaded the deck. How can game theory cope with this? One approach is to expand the analysis to include the metagame choices: players can choose actions that either adhere to rules or bend them. There is a parallel to consider with Sun Tzu’s ancient wisdom: he praised deception as the key to warfare. In cognitive warfare, deception is indeed at the core, but some argue the information age demands a new approach. Interestingly, one proposal turns Sun Tzu on its head by advocating strategic transparency: knowing that deception is pervasive and secrets are hard to keep, a player might adopt a strategy of having a plan that is robust even if the enemy knows it. In game terms, that is choosing a strategy that doesn’t rely on fooling the opponent – a kind of dominant strategy that works under various perceptions. However, such an approach is “easier said than done”, and most actors in cognitive warfare will likely continue trying to obscure the rules for their foes. The implication for game theory is that we should consider models where one player’s strategy set includes actions that manipulate the game structure. It’s a recursive, almost self-referential situation: a game within a game. Though mathematically challenging, acknowledging this leads to strategies that include resilience – preparing for the possibility that your own perceptions might be under attack, and thus maintaining flexibility. For example, a savvy player in a cognitive confrontation will assign some probability that certain information is false and hedge their decisions, effectively playing a mixed strategy over which “game” is real. This adaptive rationality – being aware that the game might change – is a skill not traditionally captured in static game theory but essential in cognitive warfare.

In summary, applying game theory to cognitive warfare means expanding the framework: players are still making decisions to maximize objectives, but those decisions now include choices about information – both using and misusing it. Utility is not just derived from outcomes given the rules, but from shaping the opponent’s view of outcomes. The strategic interplay includes deception, perception management, and exploiting or correcting misbeliefs. All of this complicates finding equilibrium outcomes, but it also provides a richer set of strategies to consider. Cognitive warfare can thus be seen as a highly dynamic, multi-level game. Next, we will look at some specific conceptual frameworks and adaptations that have been proposed to deal with this complexity, bridging the gap between classical models and the cognitive domain.

Strategic Frameworks for the Cognitive Domain: From OSI Layers to Zero Trust

As military and security thinkers grapple with cognitive warfare, they have begun to extend and adapt existing models to address the interplay of technology and human cognition. Here we highlight a few frameworks – technical and theoretical – that link game-theoretic or systematic thinking with the cognitive domain, as presented in recent strategic documents and proposals.

Cyber as a Dimension and the Expansion of the OSI Model

One novel idea is to treat “cyber” and “cognitive” elements not just as domains of warfare but as fundamental dimensions of reality in which conflict unfolds. In one white paper, the authors propose that “Cyber is a dimension of reality (along with Space, Time & Thought) which gives rise to traditional, and non-traditional, warfighting domains”. In this view, just as the physical domains (land, sea, air, space) emerge from spatial dimensions, the information and cognitive domain emerges from the cyber and thought dimensions intertwined with time. What this abstract perspective yields is an appreciation that the “battlefield” of cognitive warfare pervades many layers of human activity; it is not confined to an arena, but is an overlay on all other arenas via the information dimension.

To make this more concrete, the same thinkers extend the classic OSI model of networking into higher layers that explicitly include cognitive processes. The OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model traditionally has 7 layers (physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, application) describing how data travels from one computer to another. Some versions add an 8th layer for the human user or application. The proposed OSI-Extended model goes further, defining layers up to 13: for example, a Cognition layer (Layer 13) that encompasses an entity that can Observe-Orient-Decide-Act, an Augmented Reality layer (Layer 12) for interfaces connecting humans to cyberspace, and a Meta layer (Layer 11) for logic that binds the physical network to the “mind”. This layered model essentially stacks the human cognitive loop on top of the network stack. By doing so, it acknowledges that in cognitive warfare, attacks can occur at any layer – you could attack the data layer with a traditional hack, or the cognition layer with a piece of fake news. The model also supports mapping defenses and controls at each layer. For instance, just as one secures layer 3 (network) with firewalls and layer 7 (application) with input validation, one might secure layer 13 (cognition) with measures that ensure integrity of information and sound decision processes. In practice, that could mean technologies or policies that verify the source of information, training users to detect manipulation, or tools that provide decision-makers with better situational awareness to counteract deception. Thinking in layers helps strategists ensure no gap is left undefended – including the crucial gap between human minds and the digital information they consume. It is a recognition that the human brain itself is now part of the “system” that needs an architecture to protect it. Such a model is still conceptual, but it provides a scaffolding for integrating technical cybersecurity with psychological security.

The OODA Loop as a Cognitive Layer

We touched earlier on the OODA loop’s relevance. In the OSI-Extended model above, the entire cognition layer is essentially an OODA loop implementation. What is noteworthy is the suggestion that OODA is a natural construct that can be embedded in systems and possibly extended, but not eliminated. Some have suggested augmenting OODA with additional steps like “model” and “test” (denoted OOμDτA in the document), implying that future cognitive systems might incorporate modeling scenarios and testing decisions as part of the loop. For game theory, this hints at more complex decision cycles but fundamentally the importance of decision speed and adaptation remains. The use of OODA in a formal architecture means we might see software or AI that aids human decision-makers by quickly cycling through observe-orient phases (e.g. aggregating intelligence, highlighting anomalies) to outpace adversaries. Conversely, adversaries will target OODA: perhaps using orienting stimuli (like disinformation flashes that trigger emotional responses) to throw off our orientation. Once again, a systematic approach – mapping out how observation feeds into orientation – can help identify where cognitive attacks might hit and how to guard against them. For example, if we know the “orient” step is vulnerable to bias, we can introduce “red-team” contrarian analyses or deception detection at that stage for critical decisions. All this aligns with game theory’s focus on decision points and sequences: it’s basically building a game board of the decision cycle and placing checkpoints to ensure the game stays fair (or to outplay the opponent’s loop).

Zero Trust and Cognitive Security

Another concept borrowed from the IT world and extended to cognitive warfare is Zero Trust security. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) emerged in cybersecurity as a principle that no user or device should be inherently trusted, even if inside the network perimeter – instead, every access is verified every time. In essence, “never trust, always verify” to minimize the chance of a malicious actor exploiting implicit trust. Now apply this concept to information and cognition: one might say “trust no information source by default.” Instead of assuming a piece of news or a social media post is legitimate, a Zero Trust mentality would validate it (check provenance, cross-reference facts) before accepting it into one’s decision process. In an environment rife with deepfakes and fake news, this approach is increasingly advocated.

Concretely, the authors of the cognitive warfare paper propose a Zero Trust “Abstract” Model (ZT4) which aligns with their extended OSI layers. They define a vertical stack of zones from Data at the bottom (Zone I) up to an Intelligent Actor (human or AI agent, Zone IX) at the top, and map these to OSI-extended layers. The idea is that at each zone, certain trust policies apply. A key component is Identity – knowing exactly who or what is acting at any interface. They introduce the concept of “Presence of Identity Assertion”, meaning the system should continuously and robustly verify that an intelligent actor is who they claim to be. In practice, this could involve multi-factor authentication for humans (possibly even continuous authentication via biometrics), cryptographic identity for devices, and attestation for AI agents. Why is identity so important? Because one of the common tactics in cognitive warfare is impersonation – whether it’s a fake social media persona stirring trouble or a spoofed email from a supposed superior giving false instructions. If every actor and piece of data in a networked system had to prove its identity and integrity before being trusted, many cognitive attacks would face a significant hurdle. For example, a deepfake video purporting to be a message from a government official could theoretically be flagged if the media channel demands digital signatures from authorized senders. Or a bot army on Twitter could be curtailed if every account had to verify identity in a trusted way. Of course, implementing such stringent trust models in open societies raises privacy and practicality issues, but the concept underscores a defensive game-theoretic stance: reduce your attack surface by eliminating implicit trust.

In game theory terms, Zero Trust changes the game by removing certain strategies from the opponent – if the opponent relies on sneaking a pawn inside your camp by disguising it as one of yours, Zero Trust identity measures make that impossible or much harder. The opponent must then confront you more directly, which is a costlier strategy for them. We can think of it as raising the opponent’s payoff threshold needed to succeed in deception. The ZT4 model even suggests blending classical security controls (policy enforcement points, monitoring, etc.) with the new layers, effectively creating a unified security architecture that spans from hardware all the way to human cognition. While still theoretical, it paints a picture of future systems where cognitive security (ensuring our perceptions and decisions are not tampered with) is as much a design criterion as data security is today.

Lindian Model Theory: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Conflict

Diving more abstractly, one document introduces what it calls Lindian Model Theory – essentially a new mathematical lens for understanding interactions across multiple domains or dimensions. The core of this theory is differential set theory, which posits that when different “sets” (think of sets as domains, systems, or even concepts) intersect, they can transform one another. In classical set theory, an intersection just yields common elements, but here the idea is that interactions can change the nature of the elements involved. This is presented in a highly mathematical form in the document, describing unit vector fields and transformations when sets intersect. What does this mean intuitively? It suggests that when, say, the cyber dimension intersects with the cognitive dimension (as occurs in cognitive warfare), the interplay changes both the state of cyberspace and the state of human thought – they are not independent. Each influences the other in a dynamic, evolving way. This resonates with our understanding of feedback loops: for example, an online misinformation campaign (cyber realm) can change public opinion (thought realm), which in turn might lead to new online behaviors or content (feeding back into cyber). The Lindian model formalizes such interplay as multi-dimensional surfaces and transformations. It even constructs a 12-dimensional “meta-prism” to conceptualize all relevant dimensions, including physical and abstract ones, and suggests warfighting domains emerge as natural consequences of these dimensional interactions.

For a strategist or analyst, the utility of this approach is in breaking out of siloed thinking. Traditional game theory might treat, for example, an economic game and a propaganda game separately. A multi-dimensional approach says they are facets of one larger interaction: applying tariffs on an adversary (economic domain) might fuel a nationalist backlash in their population (cognitive domain), which then affects their willingness to negotiate (political domain). In the Lindian view, you’d consider a “move” in one dimension concurrently with its induced effects in others. This is akin to multi-board chess, where pieces on different boards affect each other’s positions. While the mathematics in Lindian Model Theory is quite complex, the philosophical takeaway for cognitive warfare is important: the battlefield is unified across dimensions. A move in cyberspace (like releasing information) can be as impactful as a move on land (advancing troops), and they are linked. The theory implies that finding equilibrium or solutions requires solving equations that encompass all these dimensions – a daunting task, but it encourages comprehensive strategies. For example, a game theory analysis enriched by Lindian thinking might consider utility functions that have components for physical success, cyber success, and cognitive success combined. It might reveal that an optimum strategy in a given conflict invests less in direct military confrontation and more in cognitive operations, or vice versa, depending on how the dimensions interplay. It’s a reminder that cognitive warfare, cyber warfare, economic competition, and kinetic war are not separate games but one big game with many dimensions. Success will come from balancing efforts across those dimensions to achieve overall strategic dominance or equilibrium.

The Human Element: Education, Identity, and Resilience

Finally, no discussion of cognitive warfare and game theory would be complete without emphasizing the role of the human participants – the “players” themselves and their preparedness. In classical games, players are abstract entities with given preferences. In cognitive warfare, the “players” often include broad groups of people (citizenries, political factions, etc.) whose preferences and even identities can be shaped over time. Building resilience into these human factors can be a decisive strategy.

One approach is through education and training. Cognitive warfare is a battle for hearts and minds, and so educating those minds is a defensive tactic. This means not only training specialized cognitive warriors (e.g., military or cyber personnel skilled in influence tactics and counter-operations) but also educating the general public to recognize and resist manipulation. A well-informed, media-literate population is far less susceptible to disinformation – raising the “cost” or lowering the success probability of an adversary’s cognitive attack. The documents provided highlight the need for what one calls “Operational Education”, where training is intermingled with real operations. For example, the UTHOUGHT program aims to train ROTC cadets in cognitive warfare by having them work on live projects that attempt to influence adversary information environments. This not only gives hands-on experience but also ensures that the training itself contributes to national objectives. It acknowledges a reality that “the instruction of Cognitive Warfare cannot take place in a vacuum” – trainees will practice their new skills whether one likes it or not, so it’s better to channel that energy constructively. In game terms, this is akin to learning-by-doing in a repeated game: each “round” of practice updates the strategies and improves future performance. A populace that undergoes some form of inoculation training – e.g., being shown how propaganda works and maybe participating in harmless simulations of it – might develop a kind of herd immunity to certain cognitive attacks. This strategy of preemptive education can be compared to vaccinating players in a game so that a certain type of move by the adversary (say, a divisive social media campaign) has less effect, forcing the adversary to adapt or abandon that tactic.

Related to education is the idea of aligning utility curves across generations or groups. One document astutely notes that to educate different generations, we must adapt our utility curves to theirs. This means recognizing that different groups value different things and learn in different ways; a message that convinces a 60-year-old might not move a 20-year-old. Strategists must tailor their approaches (both offensive and defensive) to the target audience’s mindset. In terms of game theory, it’s like acknowledging that not all players have the same payoff matrix – a piece of misinformation might greatly sway one demographic (high payoff for the attacker) but hardly register for another (low payoff). Effective cognitive warfare as well as its prevention will require segmented strategies that consider these differences.

Another human factor is identity – both in the sense of personal or group identity (national, cultural, ideological) and in the technical sense of identity authentication. Strong personal and collective identities can act as a bulwark against cognitive manipulation. For example, individuals with a strong commitment to democratic values may be less vulnerable to anti-democratic propaganda; a community with a clear shared identity might resist attempts to divide it along artificial lines. In contrast, fractured or in-crisis identities are fertile ground for adversaries to exploit, by offering appealing alternative loyalties or scapegoats to blame. This highlights a paradox: effective cognitive warfare defense might involve strengthening social cohesion and addressing internal grievances, so that outside influence finds less traction. One can view it as raising the population’s satisfaction or utility with their own system, thereby reducing the payoff an adversary gets from luring them with a different narrative. In game theory terms, if a population is content and resilient, the “game” an adversary is trying to play (say, inciting a rebellion or panic) has a very unfavorable payoff matrix for the adversary – they invest effort but get little result because the equilibrium behavior of the population is to stick with the status quo. Education, open communication from leaders, and inclusive identity-building (e.g. emphasizing shared values and truth) all contribute to this resilience.

On the technical side, as mentioned under Zero Trust, verifying identity is crucial to thwart impersonation. The cognitive security architecture envisions devices or factors that establish the presence and uniqueness of an intelligent actor. Imagine in a few years, important online discourse or command systems might require participants to be verified by something like a secure digital ID. If every tweet or post could, for instance, optionally display a “verified origin” badge based on cryptographic identity, users could choose to trust only those, severely limiting the impact of bots and trolls. It’s like playing a game where you color-code moves made by genuine players versus fake pieces. You can then discount or ignore the fake ones. There is a trade-off between anonymity (which has benefits) and authentication (which provides security), but for critical functions (like military commands, or perhaps even voting information), leaning towards strong identity verification is a clear trend. From a strategic perspective, implementing strong identity measures is a defensive move that forces the opponent into a narrower set of attack vectors (they can no longer as easily pretend to be someone from within your camp).

To sum up this section: modern strategists are actively seeking ways to systematically handle cognitive warfare – whether through extending technical models like OSI and Zero Trust into the cognitive realm, or through high-level theories like Lindian multi-dimensional analysis, or through human-focused measures of education and identity reinforcement. All of these can be seen as efforts to redefine the “game” of cognitive warfare in a way that favors defense over offense, or at least stabilizes the conflict. By creating structures where truth is verified, where minds are inoculated against deceit, and where attacks in one domain are quickly mitigated by responses in others, we approach a kind of Nash equilibrium in the cognitive domain – one where each side knows that manipulation will be countered and thus perhaps is disincentivized from extreme attempts. Whether such an equilibrium can be achieved globally is an open question, but the pursuit of it is clearly underway.

Implications and Conclusion

The intersection of classical game theory and cognitive warfare is a fascinating and complex landscape. From one angle, cognitive warfare is game theory in practice: it’s adversaries playing chess with perceptions and beliefs, each move calculated to elicit a favorable response from the opponent. The classical principles – rational choice, strategic moves and countermoves, equilibrium – still apply, but with important twists. The “pieces” in play include information and narrative; the “moves” might be a leaked document or a viral tweet; the “payoffs” are measured in shifts of public opinion or decisions not taken by the enemy. It’s as if the chessboard has expanded to include not just the battlefield and negotiation table, but the news cycle, the social media feed, and the inner thoughts of leaders and citizens.

From another angle, cognitive warfare exposes the limits of classical game theory when confronting real human behavior. People are not perfectly rational utility calculators; they can be swayed by emotion, by identity, by misinformation – which means the strategic calculus must account for psychology as much as logic. Game theory can incorporate such factors (through concepts like bounded rationality or by expanding preferences to include ideological payoffs), but it requires broadening our models. We also see that the assumption of common knowledge and fixed rules breaks down – cognitive warfare is fought precisely by manipulating knowledge and rules. Thus, a degree of unpredictability and fluidity enters the equation that makes classical solutions (like neat Nash equilibria) harder to pin down. Indeed, in a world of mutable games, perhaps the only equilibrium is a constantly shifting one, where each side adapts in a never-ending loop of measure and countermeasure.

One sobering implication is that cognitive warfare has the potential to be a negative-sum game if it spirals unchecked. Unlike a contained board game, cognitive warfare can poison the well for everyone. We’ve seen hints of this in the extreme polarization of societies where multiple actors – domestic and foreign – pump disinformation into the public sphere. Trust erodes, governance falters, and both sides of the political divide feel under attack. In game terms, it’s like an arms race where each escalation degrades the environment for both players. A source in our discussion noted how in U.S. politics the level of cognitive warfare (propaganda, misinformation) has been rising and the result is “lower and lower approval ratings for both sides” – essentially a lose-lose outcome, or in economic terms, a destruction of collective political capital. This is analogous to two firms in a price war driving each other’s profits to zero, or two countries in an info-war both ending up with destabilized societies. Game theory teaches that in repeated interactions, if negative-sum outcomes are recognized, rational players may seek to avoid them by cooperation or tacit agreements. Perhaps in the future, norms or treaties about cognitive warfare (much like those that exist for cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure) could emerge to prevent the most damaging forms of mind manipulation, in the interest of all parties. Achieving that will be difficult – verifying compliance in the cognitive realm is tricky – but it’s a topic of active discussion.

There is also a more optimistic flip side. If cognitive tactics can harm, can they also help? One intriguing suggestion from the cognitive warfare paper was to invert the methods for positive ends. It asks: if we can crash an enemy’s economy via cognitive warfare, can we not also use it to boost economies or stabilize politics, ushering in a “New Golden Age”?. This flips the game from competitive to cooperative: using game-theoretic savvy about incentives and behavior, could nations collaboratively engineer win-win cognitive outcomes (like global campaigns to fight misinformation in pandemics, or to encourage peace and tolerance)? In theory, the same understanding of utility and perception that allows us to sow discord could be used to build common ground. It would require trust and perhaps a new kind of ethics of information. In practice, we already see glimpses in efforts to counter violent extremism by online campaigns that promote dissuading narratives, or in psychological operations not to deceive a population but to reassure and direct them truthfully in crises. Education campaigns that align people’s short-term actions with long-term collective good (such as energy conservation drives, public health advisories) also fit here – essentially, they are “influence operations” but benevolent ones. Thus, cognitive techniques don’t have to lead to a dark art of war; they can be tools of soft power, diplomacy, and societal resilience if applied with restraint and transparency.

In conclusion, the relationship between classical game theory and cognitive warfare is one of both continuity and change. Continuity, because at heart we are still dealing with strategic interactions – adversaries each trying to shape outcomes to their advantage. Change, because the arena of interaction has exploded in complexity, touching the intangible realm of thoughts and perceptions, where uncertainty reigns. Game theory provides a valuable foundation to reason through these battles of the mind: it reminds us to consider the other’s viewpoint, to anticipate their moves, to seek stable solutions. But it also must evolve by incorporating insights from psychology, communications, and network science. The “games” of influence are multi-dimensional and often cooperative mixed with competitive – a true test for modern strategic thinking.

As we move deeper into the 21st century, cognitive warfare will likely become more prevalent, driven by rapid information flows and AI-enabled content creation. Societies that navigate this environment successfully will be those that educate and empower their citizens to think critically (strengthening the human firewall), that build technologies and norms to authenticate information and identity (establishing a baseline of trust), and that maintain agility in their decision loops so they are hard to deceive or wrong-foot. In game-theoretic terms, the winners will set the game’s terms, not be subject to them. They will operate with an awareness that every tweet, every video, every narrative is a potential move in a grand game for influence – and they will play with both wisdom and integrity. The hope is that by understanding the game we are in, we can master it, and perhaps even choose not to play the most destructive versions of it.

The mind may indeed be the next frontier of conflict, but with rich strategic thinking and sound preparation, it can also be the frontier of new forms of stability and cooperation. In the end, classical game theory and cognitive warfare together teach us that the ultimate high ground is not high ground at all – it is mental ground. And holding the mental high ground means fostering truth, clarity, and strategic savvy in ourselves while denying our adversaries any decisive sway over our perceptions. In this grand cognitive game, as in all games, knowledge and strategy are power. With the right blend of both, we can hope to secure not only our networks and territories, but the very thoughts and decisions that shape our collective future.

Sources: The analysis above synthesized classical game theory concepts and the emerging paradigm of cognitive warfare by drawing on multiple sources, including Jason Lind et al.’s white papers on cognitive cyberwarfare, frameworks extending cybersecurity models to the cognitive domain, and discussions on modern adversaries’ strategies of sowing chaos and confusion. These references provided both the conceptual foundations and the contemporary context for this exposé, highlighting how enduring strategic principles intersect with the novel challenges of the information age.